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Abstract 
 
The need for improved governance of oil and gas sector and sustainability of production coupled with increasing 
number of stranded marginal oil fields mandated Malaysian authorities to adjust the fields’ fiscal regime. The 
new regime came with special incentives, and changed the fiscal arrangement from production sharing contract 
to risk service contract. The influence of the new regime in comparison to the old one on marginal oil fields’ 
investment climate was simulated under nine different scenarios relating to oil prices and reserves levels. Using 
internal rate of return, it was found that the fiscal regime under risk service contract has more favorable 
investment climate in majority of the scenarios- with exception to those relating to high oil prices, which fiscal 
regime under production sharing contract is more favorable. As implication for policy, to make the new fiscal 
regime more attractive under the risk service contract, contractors’ remuneration fee should be attached not only 
to performance but also to high oil price. In essence, incentives given to contractors should be higher during 
soared oil prices. Concern should be made for the assumptions employed while applying the results for a 
decision.  
 
Keywords: Fiscal regime, incentives, production sharing contract, risk service contract 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The need for improved governance of oil and gas sector and sustainability of production coupled with growing 
numbers of stranded marginal oil fields influenced Malaysian government’s decision to introduce new fiscal 
regime for marginal oil fields in the year 2010 (Economic Transformation Program, 2010; Lacouture, 2013; 
Malaysia Petroleum Resources Corporation, 2014). The new fiscal regime changed the fiscal arrangement of 
marginal fields from production sharing contract (PSC) to risk service contract (RSC) and introduced special tax 
incentives. The new tax incentives include (i) reduced tax rate from 38 to 25 percent of chargeable profit; (ii) 
accelerated capital allowance from 10 to 5 years; (iii) waiver of export duty on oil produced and exported by 
marginal oil fields operators; (iv) investment tax allowance of 60-100 percent on qualifying capital expenditure 
(QCE) and; (v) qualified capital expenditure transferable between non-contiguous petroleum agreement within 
the same partnership or sole proprietorship. Petroleum Development Act was also amended in 2011 in line with 
the new development. 
 
Despite the fiscal regime adjustment, between November 2010 - July 2014 there were only six RSCs (Mas’ud, 
Manaf, & Saad, 2014) compared to 17 PSCs  between 2010-2012 (Ley, 2012). Thus, this study intends to 
provide empirical answer to the following research question: Does the new fiscal regime improve the investment 
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climate of marginal oil fields in Malaysia? Analyses were conducted which compared internal rate of return 
(IRR) of marginal oil field development project under two fiscal regime scenarios: scenario one used revenue 
over cost (r/c factor) PSC fiscal terms, while RSC fiscal terms were used for scenario two. The essence is to 
evaluate which of the two fiscal regimes render investment climate more attractive. Scenario analysis is not a 
real world analysis, but a simulation using different fiscal impositions at different oil prices and reserves levels 
to evaluate their differential investment attractiveness (Manaf, Saad, Ishak, & Mas’ud, 2014). Many studies 
have used similar approach (see (Johnston, 1994, 2002; Kaiser, 2007; Nakhle, 2007; Saidu & Mohammed, 
2014)).  
 
Two issues motivated the present study. First, there is global inconsistency in the literature relating to the effect 
of fiscal regime changes on investment climate. In some instances change of fiscal regime creates favorable 
investment climate, in others it render the investment climate less attractive. The second motivation is, to the 
best of our knowledge we did not come across a study which evaluate whether or not the new marginal oil 
fields’ fiscal regime under RSC arrangement improved fields’ investment climate beyond the old fiscal regime 
under PSC arrangement, hence, the need to provide empirical evidence. 
 
The paper is divided into five parts. This part is the introduction, which is followed by the second part; the 
literature review. The third part is methodology and assumptions. The fourth part is analysis and result. The last 
part is conclusion which highlights the limitation and implication for future studies. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Petroleum Fiscal Regimes in Malaysia and Investment Climate  
 
Some studies investigated the effect of fiscal regime changes on investment viability and their sensitivities to 
changes in oil price whilst, other studies investigated the influence of tax relaxation and offering new 
allowances on investment climate. Findings from the former showed that changes in oil and gas prices improve 
the investment climate by making non-commercial viable fields economically attractive (Kemp & Stephen, 
2011). On same issue, Njeru (2010) found that NPV and IRR decreased in low oil price periods, although the 
Government Take (GT) comparatively remained unchanged and vice versa. Thus, Njeru (2010) concluded that 
Kenya’s fiscal regime is not flexible enough to accommodate fluctuation in oil prices; hence, the investment 
climate may not be conducive to investors under low oil price scenarios. 
 
Evidence also showed that changes in fiscal regime may have positive influence on oil and gas project 
investment climate. In his UK study, Abdo (2010) found that relaxation of petroleum tax had different effects on 
investments in the United Kingdom Continental Shelves (UKCS), with each relaxation leading to increase in oil 
companies cash flow. Likewise, Kemp and Stephen (2011) found that when a supplementary charge (SC) was 
removed under the 2011 tax system, many fields had more better NPV than before SC removal. Kemp & 
Stephen (2012) also established that complementing 2011 tax increase with new allowances in 2012 had 
substantial positive impact on the UKCS oil and gas investments. Allowance may be a possible way to improve 
investment attractiveness of small and marginal oil fields in UKCS based on the 2011 budgetary tax provisions 
(Kazikhanova, 2012).  
 
However, other studies documented negative influence on fiscal regime changes on investment climate. In 
Nigeria, Onaiwu (2009) found investors’ profitability increased under the PSC of 1993, while the reverse was 
the case under the PSC of 2005. This mean that fiscal package of 2005 PSC has negative effect on project 
profitability compared to 1993 PSC. Nakhle and Hawdon (2004) found that the scenario of fiscal packages of 
1978-1983 generated significant reduction in profitability of small fields; this indicated that the fiscal package 
had negative impacts on investment climate of smaller fields. Moreover, higher tax rate even during higher oil 
price may discourage investment and render the fields’ investment climate unfavorable to investors, hence, 
negatively impacting government revenue (Nakhle, 2007). Evidence showed that introduction of SC of 32 % in 
UKCS in 2011 without field allowances would have had a tragic long-term negative impact on investment in 
UKCS (Kemp & Stephen, 2012). Increase in SC under the 2011 budget had a negative impact on small 
profitable fields and marginal fields (Kazikhanova, 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, some studies recorded insignificant influence of fiscal regime changes on investment climate. It 
was found that despite the tax allowances and drastic increase in oil price, the after-tax earnings of oil leases of 
1954-1969 were not greater than that of other industries on the basis of NPV, IRR and PI (Mead, Muraoka, & 
Sorensen, 1982). Similarly, Emeka, David, Yun and Li-Fei (2012) discovered that the mean and standard 
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deviation obtained from the scenario analysis for proxies used in assessing the effect of fiscal regime on 
investment climate showed little difference to the base-case values of projects’ NPV, IRR and PI. 
 
Literature documented missed results. In some instances change of fiscal regime impacted positivity on 
investment climate, in others, no effect, on the extreme is negative. Fiscal regime has different effect in different 
countries due to differential tax policies and reserve prospectively, hence, reserve outcome of one country 
cannot be applied for the others. Consequently, the present study will evaluate the investment climate of 
marginal oil fields’ in Malaysia under PSC and RSC fiscal regime scenarios.   
 
2.2  Petroleum Fiscal Regimes in Malaysia 
 
Historically, concessionary system which was repelled by PSC in 1974 had been the oldest form of fiscal 
arrangement in Malaysian oil and gas industry. This arrangement was first entered into with Shell in early 
1960s. Late 1960S also saw more companies such as Conoco and Esso who joined the race of concessionary 
arrangement in Malaysian oil and gas industry (Mehden & Troner, 2007). It fiscal components include royalty 
and tax which are levied by governments of oil and gas producing states (Lee, 2013). Emergence of PSC in 
1970s led to the abolishing of concessionary arrangement.  
 
In mid-1970s, PSC emerged in Malaysian oil and gas industry after promulgation of Petroleum Development 
Act in 1974. PSC as a fiscal arrangement has been experiencing series of adjustment with view of enhancing its 
competitiveness thereby improving the investment climate of Malaysian oil and gas industry. PSC was adjusted 
in 1985, deepwater PSCs of 1993, and Revenue over Cost PSC of 1997.  Each adjustment is normally 
accompanied by simplified and attractive fiscal terms that can encourage more participation in Malaysian oil 
and gas industry. Thus, PSC has been the most dominant form of fiscal arrangement in Malaysian oil and gas 
industry. It was documented that only 5 PSCs exist prior to 1998, but continuous simplifications of fiscal terms 
has made 83 PSCs into record as at 2012 (Lee, 2013). Lately, in 2013 PETRONAS celebrated 100 deepwater 
PSCs (Manaf, et al., 2014). 
 
Due to continuous desire to improve attractiveness of small and marginal oil fields, Malaysian government 
introduced RSC in 2010 which led to the amendment of Petroleum Development Act IN 2011 (Wei, 2011). RSC 
is an arrangement between government - represented by PETRONAS as project owner and private oil 
companies as contractors, whereby the contractors are allowed to recover the development cost incurred and be 
paid a fixed fee for the services rendered based on production and performance (PETRONAS, 2011).  As 
mentioned in the introduction this new regime that came-up with RSC arrangement contained reduced tax rate 
and allowances capable of improving marginal oil fields’ investment climate.  
 
With recent adjustment in marginal oil fields’ fiscal regime from PSC to RSC, the current study did not come 
across any others study which investigated whether or not the RSC fiscal regime has more improvement in 
marginal oil fields’ investment climate than the former PSC regime.  Consequently, the present study will 
evaluate the investment climate of marginal oil fields’ in Malaysia under PSC- specifically R/C factor PSC and 
RSC fiscal regime scenarios to understand which one has more impact. In line with this development, the study 
will test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under high oil price-high reserves. 
H1b RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under high oil price-medium reserve. 
H1c RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under high oil price-low reserve. 
H1d RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under medium oil price-high reserve. 
H1e RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under medium oil price-medium reserve. 
H1f RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under medium oil price-low reserve. 
H1g RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under low oil price- high reserve. 
H1h RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under low oil price-medium reserve. 
H1i RSC’s fiscal regime will have higher IRR than PSC’s under low oil price-low reserve. 
 
2.3  Model Derivation  
 
To achieve the objective of this paper, discount cash flow (DCF) will be used to compute project internal rate of 
return (IRR). It was disclosed in Nakhle (2007) that a survey conducted in 2001 showed that 99% of oil 
companies used DCF to evaluate the effect of fiscal regimes. The DCF is then used to compute many investment 
climate evaluation techniques such as Pay-Back Period, Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), Profitability Index (PI), Saving Index (SI) and Access to Gross Revenue (AGR). It was categorically 
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clarified that when comparing mutually exclusive project NPV is the best technique, but for evaluation of single 
project under different scenarios IRR is better (Arshad, 2012). The objective of this study is to evaluate 
investment climate of marginal fields’ development project under two fiscal regime scenarios: PSC and RSC,  
following Arshad (2012) IRR is best evaluation tool, hence it is used in this study. Before IRR computation, 
DCF of the project is calculated as:   
 
Investor’s DCF under PSC Regime 
 
 DCFt= CRt + POt – CAPEXt – OPEXt - RCESSt – EDt -TAXt   ………………………1 
 
Where; 
DCFt = Investor’s Discounted Cash Flow 
CRt = Cost recovered in year t 
POt = Share of investor’s profit oil in year t 
CAPEXt = Capital Expenditure incurred in year t 
OPEXt = Operating Expenditure in year t 
RCESSt = Research CESS in year t 
EDt = Export Duty in year t 
TAXt = Tax paid in year t 
 
Investor’s DCF under RSC Regime 
 
 DCFt= CRt+ FEEOILt - CAPEXt - OPEXt –TAXt ……………………………………………2 
 
Where; 
CRt = Cost recovery in year t 
FEEOILt = Fee Oil received in year t 
CAPEXt = Capital Expenditure in yeart 
OPEXt = Operating Expenditure incurred in year t 
TAXt = Tax paid in year t 
  
The DCF under the two fiscal regime scenarios are expressed in line with the related studies (Hao & Kaiser, 
2010; Nakhle, 2010). Then based on the DCFs above, IRR of the project under the two fiscal regime scenarios 
was computed using the following formula.  
 
Project’s IRR: Investor’s Perspective 
 
…………………………………………………………3 
Where: 
ra = lower discount rate choosen 
rb = higher discount rate choosen 
NPVa = NPV at ra 
NPVb = NPV at rb 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
3.1  Data 
 
This study used Kapal, Banang and Meranti (KBM) marginal fields project data located in Offshore Peninsular 
Malaysia. The data was obtained from the information released by the project contractor (Coastal Energy, 2012) 
and the offshore technology.com (Offshore Tecnology.com, 2014). Hence, assumptions relating to productions, 
reserves, costs and duration are based on the information from these sources. 
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Fig.1. Kapal, Banang and Meranti Fields (KMB) Offshore Peninsular Malaysia 
 
3.2  Provisions for the Two Scenarios: R/C Factor PSC and RSC Fiscal Regimes 
 
The following fiscal provisions for R/C factor PSC and RSC contained in Table 1 and 2 were used in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 1. Fiscal Provisions for R/C Factor PSC and RSC 
R/C Factor 
PSC Scenario 
Royalty of 10 % on gross production, PIT of 38%, Research CESS of 0.5 % Capital allowance for 10 
years, Export Duty 10% and Cost recovery and profit split based on R/C ratio in Table 2 below. 
RSC Scenario 
Royalty paid by PETRONAS on its share, CIT of 25% no Research CESS, Accelerated Capital Allowance 
for 5years, Zero Export Duty, Remuneration fee 10%, and 100% cost recovery. 
 
Table 2. R/C Ratio for Malaysian 1998 PSC 
Contractor’ R/C  
Ratio 
                         Cost Oil                                                                Profit Oil 
Cost Oil 
Ceiling 
Unused Cost Oil  
PETRONAS: Contractor 
Profit Oil 
PETRONAS: Contractor 
0.0< R/C < =1.0 70% N.A 20:80 
1.0 < R/C <= 1.4 60% 20:80 30:70 
1.4 < R/C <= 2.0 50% 30:70 40:60 
2.0 < R/C <=2.5 30% 40:60 50:50 
2.5 < R/C <=3.0 30% 50:50 60:40 
R/C> 3.0 30% 60:40 70:30 
 
3.3  Reserve, Production and Duration Assumptions 
 
It was estimated that the recoverable reserves of KMB marginal field range from 15 to 35 million barrels 
(Coastal Energy, 2012). We assumed three reserve levels; small, medium and large with 15, 25 and 35 million 
barrels of oil equivalents. 
 
It was also estimated that KMB fields lower production is 4,530 barrels per day (bpd) of oil, 4 million metric 
cubic feet (mmcf) of gas which is equivalent of 5,220 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) based on American 
Petroleum Institute (API) conversion of 6:1. That is 1 barrel of oil is equivalent to 6 mcf of gas. The annual 
production at lower range will be 1,905,300 boe. During higher period the production stand at 16,495bpd of oil 
and 14mmscf of gas which is equivalent to 18,909 boe per day, while the annual production during high 
production period will be 6,901,785 boe.  
 
The KMB contract will last for 8 years 2012 to 2019, and production was started in December, 2013 (Lacouture, 
2013). Therefore, based on this data it was assumed that for small fields (15millions boe), production started at 
lower range in the second year – December, 2013, it reached its peak in the third years - 2014 and then declined 
at 45% annually up to 2019. For medium fields (25millions boe), it was assumed that production started at lower 
range in the second year –December, 2013, it reached its peak in the third years- 2014 and then declined at 21% 
annually up to 2019. For larger fields (35millions boe), it was assumed that production started at lower range in 
the second year – December, 2013, it reached its peak in the third year - 2014 and then declined at 6% annually 
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up to 2019. Similar assumption was made in previous studies based on other reserve levels (see (Ghandi & Lin, 
2014; Hao & Kaiser, 2010; Kaiser, 2007; Saidu & Mohammed, 2014)). Table 3 presents reserves, production 
and depletion rate assumptions used in the analyses. 
 
Table 3.Reserve, Production and Depletion Assumptions 
Large Size Marginal Field 
(≈35mboe) 
Medium Size Marginal Field 
(≈25mboe) 
Small Size Marginal Field 
(≈15mboe) 
Year Production Year Production Year Production 
2012 
 
2012 
 
2012 
 2013 156600 2013 156600 2013 156600 
2014 6901785 2014 6901785 2014 6901785 
2015 6487678 2015 5452410 2015 3795982 
2016 6098417 2016 4307404 2016 2087790 
2017 5732512 2017 3402849 2017 1148284 
2018 5388561 2018 2688251 2018 631556.5 
2019 5065248 2019 2123718 2019 347356.1 
Total 35,830,802   25,033,017   15,069,354 
  Decline Rate: effective from 2014 
  6%   21%   45% 
 
3.4  Development and Operation Costs Assumption 
 
It was estimated that the development cost (capital expenditure - CAPEX) of KMB marginal fields is 
equivalents to USD 320 million to be expended within three (3) years (Coastal Energy, 2012). Therefore, this 
assumed in this study. There is no specific operating cost data available for KMB fields; however, average 
operational/lifting cost (operational expenditure - OPEX) within Asia is USD 9.5 per barrel (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2014b). Therefore, we assumed this rate for KMB fields in this analysis. 
 
3.5  Price Assumption 
 
Three Brent spot crude oil prices were assumed: low, medium and high. The highest average annual Brent spot 
crude oil prices from 1987-2040 based on nominal dollar value of 2012 is USD 141.46, while the lowest is USD 
17.2 (US Energy Information Administration, 2014a). We used these two prices to arrive at medium oil price - 
i.e. 141.46 plus 17.2 divided by 2 which equaled to 79.33. Thus, USD 79.33 was used as medium oil price. In 
summary, three Brent oil prices were assumed: high, medium and low with values of USSD 141.46, USD 79.33 
and USD 17.2 respectively. It is important to note that the duration of KMB fields development project i.e. 2012 
- 2019 is covered by the Brent oil price projection of 1987- 2040, providing sufficient justification for prices 
assumed in the analysis.  
 
3.6  Service Fee Assumption 
 
Many press releases on Malaysian RSC revealed that contractors are entitled to per barrel remuneration fee 
attached to performance. However, Lacouture (2013) reported that contractors of Malaysian marginal fields 
under RSC receive 10% of per barrel revenue as a remuneration fee. Therefore, we assumed 10% remuneration 
fee for RSC contractors.  
 
3.7  Discount Rate Assumption 
 
In line with other studies, this study assumed 15% discount rate for computation of DCF (Kaiser & Pulsipher, 
2004; Saidu & Mohammed, 2014). The DCF was then used in calculating IRR of different oil prices and 
reserves scenarios. 
 
3.8  Analytic Procedure 
 
The assumptions set out above were used to calculate the DCF and IRR of KMB marginal fields under different 
scenarios relating to oil prices and reserves level. The computations were performed using Excel spreadsheet 
that has inbuilt formula for IRR. 
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4. ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
 
As mentioned earlier, analysis for the computation of IRR based on investor’s DCF under R/C factor PSC and 
RSC fiscal regimes scenarios were performed using excel. The output from such analysis is depicted in Figure 2 
below. 
 
 
Fig. 2. KMB Fields IRR under Different Price and Reserve Assumptions 
 
In line with the analysis in Figure 2 above, the result of the study is presented in Table 4 below. Based on this 
result, the hypothesis raised in 2.2 above was tested. 
 
Table 4. Results 
Hypotheses Statements 
IRR 
Results 
PSC RSC 
H1a RSC has higher IRR under High Oil Price-High Reserve 61% 43% Not supported 
H1b RSC has higher IRR under High Oil Price-Medium Reserve 43% 36% Not supported 
H1c RSC has higher IRR under High Oil Price-Small Reserve 39% 26% Not supported 
H1d RSC has higher IRR under Medium Oil Price-High Reserve 22% 62% Supported 
H1e RSC has higher IRR under Medium Oil Price-Medium Reserve 27% 27% Not supported 
H1f RSC has higher IRR under Medium Oil Price-Low Reserve 17% 18% Supported 
H1g RSC has higher IRR under Low Oil Price-High Reserve 0% 23% Supported 
H1h RSC has higher IRR under Low Oil Price-Medium Reserve 0% 17% Supported 
H1i RSC has higher IRR under Low Oil Price-Low Reserve 0% 9% Supported 
 
The results in Table 4 revealed that RSC fiscal regime is not favored by high oil price. During oil price hike of 
USD 141.46 and above, PSC fiscal regime seems more likely to make investment climate of marginal oil fields 
favorable than RSC fiscal regime. Specifically, the result revealed that PSC is more likely to make investment 
climate of Malaysian marginal oil fields favorable under high oil price-high reserve (PSC-IRR= 61%, RSC-IRR 
=43%), high oil price-medium reserve (PSC-IRR= 43%, RSC-IRR =36%) and high oil price-low reserve (PSC-
IRR= 39%, RSC-IRR =26%). This is only the case under three high oil price scenarios. 
 
Conversely, RSC fiscal regime is favored by medium oil prices. During oil prices of approximately USD 79.33, 
investment climate will likely be more attractive in Malaysia under RSC than PSC fiscal regime. Specifically, 
the result showed that RSC is more likely to make marginal oil fields investment climate more favorable under 
medium oil price-high reserve (PSC-IRR= 22%, RSC-IRR =62%), medium oil price-low reserve (PSC-IRR= 
17%, RSC-IRR =18%). However, the two regimes will likely have equal influence on investment climate under 
medium oil price-medium reserve (PSC-IRR= 27%, RSC-IRR =27%).  
 
Moreover, RSC fiscal regime is also favored by low oil prices. When oil price is approximately USD 17.2, RSC 
fiscal regime seems more likely to improve investment climate of marginal oil fields in Malaysia, than PSC. 
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Specifically, the result highlighted that investment climate under RSC fiscal regime is likely to be more 
favorable than PSC under low oil price-high reserve (PSC-IRR= 0%, RSC-IRR =23%), low oil price-medium 
reserve (PSC-IRR= 0%, RSC-IRR =17%), and low oil price-low reserve (PSC-IRR= 0%, RSC-IRR =9%). 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
 
Scenario analysis conducted revealed that out of the nine scenarios analyzed in this study using PSC and RSC 
fiscal terms for the evaluation of marginal oil fields’ investment climate, RSC is favored by five compared to 
only three for PSC. For the remaining one, investment climate under PSC and RSC fiscal regimes is likely to be 
the same. 
 
The findings should be applied with caution due to assumptions employed. Not in this study alone, any other 
study on the influence of fiscal regime on investment climate using scenario analysis owned peculiar 
assumptions relating to oil prices, reserve levels, depletion rates, costs, fiscal terms and discount rate. Such 
assumptions should be borne in mind while applying the result for a decision.  
 
The implication to policy is, even though the fiscal regime under RSC arrangement was favored by majority of 
the scenarios- with exception of those relating to high oil prices, to make the new regime more attractive, 
contractors’ remuneration fee should be attached not only to performance but also to high oil price. In essence, 
incentives given to contractors should be higher as oil price soared.   
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